The clash between 4,000 German and Soviet tanks in western Ukraine in June 1941 became the largest armored battle in history: the Battle of Dubno-Brody. The Germans’ advance was first halted by the armored heavy Soviet carriages – until the Luftwaffe took control of the air.
The battles of Dubno-Brody at the end of June 1941 are now considered to be the largest armored battle in history. Despite the fact that over four thousand tanks were involved in a few days of fighting, the battle was unknown well into the 1990s. The day-to-day World War II kiosk uprising from 1977 only tells that army group Syd encountered “tougher resistance” at the end of June. It was not until John Erickson’s The Road To Stalingrad that the operations of the Southwest Front were discussed in detail, and Erickson’s disciple David Glanz has since dug further into history.
Also Read: World War I History background
Convinced of German attack
In the summer of 1941, the German-Russian border between the Pripyat Swamp and the Carpathians looked like a mirror-inverted “S”. In the southern arch lay the former Polish city of Lviv. In the north, the small town of Sokal was the easternmost point in Gerd von Rundstedt’s army group Syds line.
Rundstedt had orders to attack from the “northern arch” in the direction of Kiev. The spearhead of the attack was Ewald von Kleist’s Panzer Group 1. North of the armored group, the 6th Army would advance along the edge of the Pripyat Swamp, and south of it, the 17th Army would push the “southern arch” backwards towards Lviv.
On the Soviet side, the Southwest Front was scattered rather than grouped. Commander General Mikhail Kirponos had for several weeks been convinced that the Germans were going to attack and tried to group their units for defense. When he did not receive permission, he had begun preparations on his own initiative, but Stalin reportedly called him and explained that “there will be no war.”
Finally, on June 21, 1941, Kirponos received permission to increase preparedness. He ordered that the Southwest Front take a position in the line of defense at the border called the “Molotov Line”. Enormous numbers of troops and materiel were set in motion, crowded on roads and at railway stations, were in the way and mixed up.
Began to break the Molotov line
The mobilization mercilessly revealed that there was a lack of equipment and supplies, and that they did not practice things that were suddenly necessary. Still, it barely took 24 hours for Kirpono’s divisions to make a difference. They had time to march and in many cases get in position – in contrast to the forces north of Pripjatträsken.
At dawn on June 22, Army Group South’s infantry divisions began to break through the Molotov line while Soviet troops tried to occupy it. The fighting was tougher than anywhere else along the front this morning. At the same time, the Luftwaffe attacked the Soviet air forces, but even here the increase in preparedness made a difference. Over the next few days, Kirponos’ flight squadrons offered desperate resistance, instead of being wiped out on the ground.
Kleist wanted to break through both at Sokal and at Volodymyr-Volynskyj 40 km further north. At lunch, the German infantry had taken Sokal and the 11th Armored Division was deployed to attack at depth.
Lack of communication
Kirponos had two armies at the front. To the north, in front of Kleist’s armor, was the 5th Army and along the arch around Lviv was the 6th. The German breakthrough struck along the border between the two armies, making it unclear who would address the problem. At the same time, the Soviet connection between the regiments and divisions constantly broke down.
There were too few radios and even fewer signalers. Communication between higher staffs, on the other hand, was by telephone and worked better. The generals could scold each other, but not get much more done. In addition, Stalin was able to call and hand out orders over Kirponos’ head.
Also Interesting: Jet aircrafts in world war II
An illustrative example was that at Volodymyr-Volynskyj the Germans had met with furious opposition from the 87th marksmanship division. But Kirponos had no contact with his division and did not know what was going on, while Kleist kept his armored units waiting while his infantry fought with the reluctant defenders.
Controlled 3400 tanks
Kirponos had six large mechanized corps with about 3,400 tanks in the area. At Lutsk, almost directly in the way of Kleist’s intended attack, stood the 22nd mechanized corps with 710 chariots (of which 30 T-34 and KV-1). At Lviv, seventy miles south of the breakthrough, lay the 4th mechanized corps with another 700 chariots (of which 100 were T-34 and KV-1).
Further south, in Uman, there was the huge 8th Mechanized Corps consisting of 900 chariots (including 170 T-34 and KV-1) – it alone consisted of more chariots than the entire Kleist armored group. To the east of these were the 15th mechanized corps’ 750 carriages (with 130 T-34 and KV-1), if you want another group. Finally, the two smaller corps, 9th and 19th mechanized, with 300 (no T-34 or KV-1) and 450 wagons (only five T-34 and KV-1), were just over a dozen miles to the east.
In total, 710 tanks stood in the way of Kleist’s 720. At the same time, 1,900 tanks threatened his southern flank and another 750 his northern. Of these, 450 wagons were new T-34 and KV-1, whose thick armor the German 37 mm cannons had difficulty hitting. To sharpen the math further, only two-thirds of Kleist’s wagons were Panzer III and IV with larger-caliber cannons.
Only the Panzer III was armed with 50 mm cannons that had a real chance against the T-34. The rest of his fleet was obsolete light wagons. In addition, Kleist kept one of his divisions in reserve and 140 of his tanks were deployed only around the turn of the month. Kirponos, on the other hand, had almost 1,000 wagons in addition scattered in smaller reserves.
Stalin’s order was unrealizable
Kirponos realized that his front had been breached at Sokal and correctly assumed that this was the German main attack. At five o’clock he gave the 15th and 4th mechanized corps orders to attack the breakthrough. The 8th mechanized corps further south also received the same order. The units had previously received approximately the same order from the 6th Army commander, something that would create many misunderstandings in the coming days.
Later in the evening, Stalin had recovered from the shock of being attacked and ordered a counter-offensive without any regard for reality. “Directive number 3” ordered the Southwest Front to surround and defeat the German armies in front of it and then advance towards Lublin.
It all took two days. Kirponos replied to Stalin that he needed more time. It would take weeks before Stalin understood the extent of the Soviet losses during the first days of the war, and over a year before he stopped ordering attacks in time and out of time.
At midnight, Stalin’s envoy General Zhukov arrived at Kirpono’s headquarters and, after some heated discussions, realized that Stalin’s plan was unworkable. Zhukov approved Kirpono’s plan, and went out into the night to find the 8th Mechanized Corps.
Zhukov’s flinging was effective in the sluggish Soviet system. This is what he had done when he defeated the Japanese at Chalchin-Gol. He was everywhere, inspected, ordered and threatened. For the next few days, he was constantly on the move to make Kirpono’s plan work.
The Germans panicked
The next day, Kleist’s attack continued without a clear breakthrough. At dawn, the 11th Armored Division clashed closely with parts of the 4th Mechanized Corps in what would become a battle typical of the battle. The Soviet wagons attacked, contemptuously and without support. For a brief moment, panic broke out among the Germans when they realized that the T-34 and KV-1 wagons seemed invulnerable.
But the Germans recovered quickly, and while the Soviet wagons were knocked out by aircraft, artillery or infantry, the German tanks chased after the “softer parts” of the enemy. The attack crumbled in individual wagons that fired at everything that came in their way – until they were knocked out, lost heart or ran out of grenades.
One of the many Soviet problems was that the units “marched apart” on their way to the front. In the mechanized corps, first came the tanks, followed by artillery pulled by trucks, and then the infantry on foot. Finally, the artillery pulled by tractors arrived. Entire units got lost or got stuck on the road.
Halfway to Kiev, the 9. mechanized corps looted 200 trucks from a district reserve to even move its infantry. What on paper the day before had been around 3,400 tanks quickly eroded away. Of the 900 carriages of the mechanized corps, 150 were already missing.
Soviet attack failed
In the evening, the southern German breakthrough had penetrated more than 60 km on Soviet soil. The Germans now also broke through at Volodymyr-Volynskyj and Kleist let two new armored divisions move east.
On the 24th the German attack continued along two lines, while the 6th Army south of the breakthrough tried to cover an ever longer front behind its own flank. The 5th Army did not even succeed. A forty-mile-wide hole now gaped between the Soviet armies. The 22nd Mechanized Corps, which was in the middle of the hole and had spent two days waiting for its artillery, was now ordered to stop Kleist’s northern breakthrough. The attack was a complete failure.
The union leader suddenly lost half his strength, over 300 carriages had disappeared. Eventually he sent 50 chariots to meet the German 13th and 14th Armored 300s. In the evening he had fallen and on the way to Lutsk German tanks passed rows of abandoned Soviet ditons. As a unit, the 22nd Corps had collapsed, although its subdivisions still offered resistance.
On June 25, the 11th German Armored Division rolled into Dubno, 105 kilometers from the border and hours before the Kirponos Division sent to hold the city. Behind followed the 16th Armored Division and protected the advance flank. At the same time, Kleist’s north was close to Lutsk through hordes of fugitives who escaped Soviet counterattacks. In the evening, they had gained a foothold in the city. That same afternoon, the commander of the 8th Mechanized Corps stated that he was in the starting position to attack the Germans’ southern flank.
Supported by aircraft and artillery
But he had lost half his strength and had received three different orders on how to attack. At the same time, it was clear that the 4th Mechanized Corps, which would attack along with the 8th and 15th Corps, had been deployed further south, where the German 17th Army was pushing against Lviv.
After four days of brutal “training at work”, the Soviet counterattacks began in earnest. Kirponos sledgehammer, the 8th and 15th mechanized corps, attacked from the south and hit the 16th Armored Division in the crest of the southern breakthrough. The heavy Soviet tanks were again impossible to stop and this time had the support of both aircraft and artillery.
The 16th Armored Division suffered heavy losses, was pushed back and exposed the back of the 11th Armored Division, which moved further east from Dubno. In the same crank, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps attacked and met Kleist’s northern close. The Soviet corps, which had few modern wagons, was slowly driven backwards.
During the night, the Soviet armored units succeeded in two complicated maneuvers. The 19th Mechanized Corps withdrew to concentrate from the north on the void behind the 11th Armored Division. At the same time, the 8th mechanized corps also detached skilfully and aimed at the same void from the south.
The only time in history the T-35 came into combat
It became increasingly clear that the extent to which Soviet units “palled the pressure” differed. Some continued to function as units while others as 22nd or 4th mechanized fell apart into stray parts. It depended a lot on the commanders: for example, Ryabyshev, who led the 8th Mechanized, would lead attacks throughout the war and not stop attacking until he encountered the British in Wismar.
On June 27, north of the Pripyat Swamp, the huge Minsk pocket was closed and captured 350,000 soldiers and 4,500 tanks. South of the swamp, von Rundstedt also described the situation as “serious”. At dawn, 200 heavy tanks from the 8th Mechanized Corps had attacked the backs of the 11th Armored Division, chasing panty linemen and artillerymen in front of them.
It was a powerful attack and probably the only time in history the giant T-35 came into combat. The Soviet wagons arrived in Dubno, defended by collapsed German units. At the same time, further west, the 15th Mechanized Corps attacked German infantry, which hurried forward to protect the long German flank. There were fierce battles that led nowhere and the Germans began to drive back the Soviet forces.
The following day, more and more chaotic battles were fought. Both sides’ planes chased across the battlefield and did not always distinguish between friend and foe. The German 11th Armored Division was cut off and could do little more than defend itself. There was a chance here for Kirpono’s tank unit to crush the German lead, but rapidly marching German infantry penetrated deeper and deeper behind the 8th Mechanized Corps (which attacked the back of the 11th Armored Division and which in turn was attacked in the back).
The Germans filled up with infantry
While the Germans filled up with new units, Soviet reserves such as the 37th Rifle Corps stood still some distance from the fighting, awaiting orders that never came. In the northeast, the Soviet 9th and 19th mechanized corps launched new, minor attacks, but were slowly driven backwards. Later in the afternoon, the 15th Mechanized Corps attacked with almost 200 BT-7 wagons. But instead of helping the increasingly pressured 8th Mechanized Corps, the attack was launched against well-prepared German infantry further west.
On June 29, the Germans managed to maintain a cohesive front and filled with more and more infantry. The battles in the air were almost settled and the Germans received more and more air support. The 11th Armored Division was rescued without drama, at the same time as the headquarters of the Mechanized Corps was knocked out by an air strike. After that, the corps had a total of two radios left.
In the 8th mechanized corps, all fuel ran out and about twenty modern wagons were left standing. They had done everything that could be asked of them. In the north, it is said that the commander of the 9th Mechanized Corps, Rokossovsky, refused to attack again because he had no tanks left to attack with. The corps next to him had 30 wagons left of its 450.
Soviet tank soldiers retreated on foot
On the night between 29 and 30, Lviv fell into a chaos of revenge and ethnic cleansing. The Soviet 6th Army withdrew so as not to be encircled. Around Dubno the fighting ebbed. The remaining Soviet tank soldiers at Dubno had their last tanks blown up and retreated on foot.
Some of them did not reach their own units until a month later. The Germans salvaged and repaired their tanks, while there were hardly any soldiers left who could repair tanks on the Soviet side. If a wagon got a slightest mistake, it stood still and was lost.
On June 30, Stalin approved the withdrawal of the Kirponos from the Southwest Front to the old border. But there were few tanks left to pull out of the fighting. Most units had lost more than three quarters of their wagons. The German air force chased relentlessly for the retreating units.
The last act of the battle was a farce. On July 1, more than two hundred wagons from the 22nd Mechanized Corps found out of the swamp they had been stuck in the past week and were immediately put into an attack on Kleist’s northern flank. As in a replay, they hit an open flank and chased German troopers until the Luftwaffe fell over the columns of tanks. The battle was over.
Hardest battles during Barbarossa’s introduction
The southwestern front was allowed to retreat to what was called the Stalin Line, with the Germans on their heels. On July 5, they broke through the line of defense and called in a couple of weeks into the southern half of the Southwest Front at Uman.
One hundred thousand Soviet soldiers fell and as many were captured. Army Group South’s advance then stopped for a few weeks before launching the attack, which in September included Kiev in the largest encirclement battle in history. In all, more than 600,000 Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner of war.
The effects of the battles around Dubno-Brody are difficult to estimate in retrospect. It was without a doubt the toughest battle during Barbarossa’s introduction. But even if Kleist’s units were bruised, they could continue against Kiev. The armored group lost up to 200 wagons, half of which could be repaired. The southwestern front lost over 3,000 carriages. At the same time, the Russians lost over 1,500 machines in the air war, while the Germans’ losses were below 100.
General Rokossovsky got revenge
There were many lessons to be learned. The shock for the Germans was, of course, that the modern Soviet tanks were difficult to strike with the anti-tank weapons at their disposal. At the same time, the Soviet inability to include infantry and artillery in the major armored attacks meant that their superior chariots could still be knocked out.
The difficult-to-lead Soviet armored divisions set up last year were never rebuilt after the disasters of June. Instead, much smaller, more flexible and more easily guided mechanized corps were developed.
One of the leaders in the development was General Rokossovsky, who led the 9th Corps at Dubno-Brody. He got his revenge on the victors from Dubno-Brody when in November 1942 he led the great attack that surrounded the 1st Panzer Group in Stalingrad.